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Non-technical summary: The German system of social welfare is widely per-
ceived as one major cause of high unemployment rates among the unskilled. It com-
prises social assistance and unemployment assistance. Both programmes provide
income support predominantly for those persons who either have exhausted their
unemployment benefits or who do not have enough labour market experience to re-
ceive those benefits. In the recent public debate, the system of social assistance in
particular has been held responsible for creating labour market disincentives on two
grounds: first, the level of social assistance is usually considered too high so as to
impose sufficient incentives to take up a low-income job. Secondly, further disincen-
tives are created by high transfer withdrawal rates involving a considerable amount
of benefits lost when welfare recipients earn supplementary labour incomes. These
disincentives effects have led politicians and academics to advocate programs making
labour market participation attractive enough to reduce the need for welfare receipt.
What is common with the majority of these proposals is that they generally suggest
a reduction in effective marginal tax rates in the lower income ranges associated with
a decrease in social benefits to stimulate labour supply.
The present paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess
the effectiveness of recent social welfare reform proposals in terms of their impact on
labour supply and unemployment. We employ the CGE-model PACE-L to simulate a
variety of reform proposals. This model incorporates important institutional features
of the German labour market. In particular, PACE-L accounts for sectoral wage
bargaining and contains a relatively detailed incorporation of the German tax-benefit
system. Moreover, the model employs a discrete choice model of labour supply where
individuals can choose from a finite set of hours only.
Compared to microsimulation studies, which generally take a partial equilibrium
perspective, the main advantage of our approach lies in the ability to identify general
equilibrium effects of reform proposals. This is important for several reasons: first,
one important aspect of welfare reforms that is typically neglected by microsimulation
studies is e.g. the impact on wage formation. Provided that additional labour supply
reduces the equilibrium wage, this is likely to have negative feed-back effects on labour
supply. Second, a general equilibrium approach enables us to take into account the
consequences of welfare reforms for the demand side of the labour market. This
is particularly important for an assessment of the employment effects as positive
employment effects are to be expected only if additional labour supply is at least
partially absorbed by labour demand.
In sum, our numerical results indicate that substantial employment effects may
be expected only from major cuts in welfare payments. General equilibrium wage
responses are found to be rather modest. However, as both reform proposals entail
a slight decrease in unemployment, this suggests that the union wage reactions are
strong enough to prevent additional labour supply translating into higher unemploy-
ment. Moreover, although the general equilibrium wage reactions can be shown to
mitigate the labour supply effects, these effects appear to be rather small.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, the German economy experienced a substantial increase in unem-
ployment especially among low-skilled workers. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the
unemployment rate in Western Germany of workers without any vocational qualifica-
tion has risen to about 20 per cent while unemployment rates among workers holding
a vocational degree increased only to 5 per cent (IAB 2002). The German system
of social welfare is widely perceived as a major cause of this. It comprises social
assistance and unemployment assistance. Both programmes are means-tested and
provide income support predominantly for those persons who have either exhausted
their unemployment benefits or who do not have enough labour market experience
to receive those benefits. In recent public debate, the system of social assistance in
particular has been held responsible for creating labour market disincentives on two
grounds: first, the level of social assistance is usually considered too high so as to
impose sufficient incentives to take up a low-income job. Secondly, high transfer with-
drawal rates involve a considerable amount of benefits lost when welfare recipients
earn supplementary labour incomes. In light of these disincentives effects, several re-
form proposals have been made aiming at improving incentives of low-income workers
to participate in the labour market (e.g. Sinn et al. 2002, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat
2002, Breyer et al. 2004). What is common with the majority of these proposals
is that they generally suggest a reduction in marginal tax rates in the lower income
ranges associated with a decrease in social benefits to stimulate labour supply (for
an overview see e.g. Zimmermann 2003).
To assess the effectiveness of reform proposals in terms of their impact on em-
ployment, income distribution and government expenditures, microsimulation studies
have now become widely used for a quantitative analysis of tax-benefit reforms. Since
these reforms are generally designed to stimulate labour supply and employment, the
principal aim of microsimulation studies is to take into account behavourial effects
of policy reforms when estimating their budgetary and distributional consequences.
There are a number of microsimulation studies concerned with a quantitative assess-
ment of social welfare reforms in Germany (e.g. Buslei and Steiner 1999, Kaltenborn
2000, Steiner 2000, Bonin et al. 2002, and Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus 2003). How-
ever, a common drawback of microsimulation studies is that they generally focus
on labour supply effects at given wages and fail to account for general equilibrium
effects of tax-benefit reforms. This may be justified as long as the number of individ-
uals who are affected by such a reform is small. By contrast, if a policy concerns a
large fraction of the relevant population, general equilibrium effects may change the
results considerably. One important aspect is e.g. the general equilibrium impact
of welfare reforms on wage formation. In a competitive labour market, additional
labour supply may be expected to decrease the wage in equilibrium which is likely
to have negative feed-back effects on labour supply. With union wage bargaining, a
reduction in welfare payments may be expected to weaken the fall-back position of
union workers which is also likely to translate into lower union wages. Furthermore,
another relevant aspect commonly neglected by microsimulation approaches are the
consequences of welfare reforms for the demand side of the labour market: identifying
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the effects on labour demand is crucial for an assessment of the employment effects
as positive employment effects are to be expected only if additional labour supply is
at least partially absorbed by labour demand.
To overcome the problems associated withmicrosimulation approaches, the present
paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the effectiveness
of recent social welfare reform proposals in terms of their impact on labour supply
and unemployment. To date, there is no work that we are aware of that attempts to
quantify the employment effects of German social welfare reforms in a computable
general equilibrium setting. We employ the CGE-model PACE-L, which incorpo-
rates important institutional features of the German labour market (Böhringer et al.
2002, Boeters et al. 2004). The model accounts for sectoral wage bargaining and
contains a relatively detailed incorporation of the German tax-benefit system. More-
over, PACE-L employs a discrete choice model of labour supply where individuals
can choose from a finite set of hours only. These kinds of models have recently be-
come increasingly popular in modelling labour supply as they provide a more realistic
description of supply choices open to individuals (see e.g. van Soest 1995, Blundell
and MaCurdy 1999). Moreover, discrete choice models allow for a straightforward
distinction between labour supply responses along the intensive and the extensive
margin. This difference is crucial because adverse labour supply effects that are gen-
erated by the present social assistance system primarily concern the participation
decision, i.e. labour supply along the extensive margin. The incorporation of differ-
ent working time categories enables us to differentiate households not only in terms
of skill-composition and age but also in terms of the chosen working time. The latter
point is particularly important as low-income employment may not only result from
low wages but also from few hours worked.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the key
features of the present German social assistance system and presents the main char-
acteristics of recent reform proposals. Section 3 provides a brief description of the
labour market module of the CGE-model PACE-L, which turns out to be most rel-
evant for the present analysis. Section 4 discusses the expected economic effects of
the reform scenarios that are presented in Section 2, while Section 5 reports the
simulation results. Finally, we offer some discussion and conclusions in Section 6.
2 Reforming Social Assistance in Germany
2.1 Design of the German Status-Quo-System
The present section describes the key features of the German social assistance sys-
tem. Social assistance (SA) becomes relevant only if the other transfer systems (e.g.
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance) do not provide sufficient income
support. In particular, eligibility for SA payments requires that income from other
sources fall short of some specified basic minimum income level. As a consequence,
households who receive transfer payments from other sources may also be eligible for
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SA, if those transfers are smaller than the specified minimum income level. While
SA recipients may keep a small amount of earned labour incomes, transfer payments
from other sources are fully deducted from SA payments. According to SA legisla-
tion, persons who are able to work are obliged to take any effort to earn their support
themselves. Refusing to take up work may be sanctioned by a 25 per cent cut in SA
benefits - in practice, however, this legislation is far from being fully enforced (Ochel
2003).
Household type Average monthly SA
minimum income in €1)
Disposable
 labour income
 low-skilled in €2)
Wage-assistance
differential
in  per cent
Single no children 581.00 1212.85 108.8
Single 1 child 920.00 1419.65 54.3
Single 2 children 1215.00 1573.65 29.5
Single > 2 children 1586.00 1727.65 8.9
Married couple no children 899.00 1398.38 55.5
Married couple 1 child 1110.00 1552.38 39.9
Married couple 2 children 1343.00 1706.38 27.1
Married couple  > 2 children 1768.00 1860.38 5.2
 Table 1: Wage-assistance differentials for different household types
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2002) and own calculations.
1) Average over all German recipient households of the respective household type.
2) The disposable labour income consists of net labour earnings and child benefits. For the details of these calculations see
section 3.1.3 and the appendix.
The basic minimum income level is household-specific and depends on household
size and composition. In what follows, this minimum income will be referred to as
the "SA minimum income". The SA minimum income specified to cover the so-called
"socio-cultural" minimum consists of a basic rate ("Regelsatz") for each household
member and a supplement covering housing and heating costs. Moreover, payments
for special needs may be added. The basic rate for each household member will be
referred to as the "basic SA rate". For the household head, for example, this rate
currently amounts to about 300 C= per month. The second column of Table 1 displays
average total monthly SA minimum incomes for different household types in 2001
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2002).
The design of the German SA system is widely criticised for creating labour supply
disincentives on two grounds: first, the gap between earned labour income of low-
skilled workers and SA minimum income with zero labour supply is usually considered
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too small to encourage labour market participation. The wage-assistance differential,
which measures by which amount disposable labour income exceeds the SA minimum
income in percentage terms, provides an illustrative measure to assess the quantitative
extent of this disincentive effect. The last column of Table 1 displays wage-assistance
differentials for different household types. The calculations are performed on the basis
of a full-time job of 38 hours per week. For couples, only either one of the partners is
assumed to work while the spouse receives no labour or transfer income. The wage-
assistance differentials reported in Table 1 reveal that the gap between disposable
labour income and SA income ranges from 5.2 to about 55 per cent, except for singles
without children, who exhibit a wage-assistance differential of more than 100 per
cent. Moreover, the differential generally decreases with the number of children.
Single parents and couples with more than two children exhibit a differential of less
than 10 per cent. This is primarily caused by the fact that average basic SA rates
for children exceed child benefits that are available for those individuals not entitled
to SA payments. The figures reported in Table 1 therefore suggest that the present
SA level appears to create considerable labour supply disincentives, particularly for
low-income workers with children.
A guaranteed minimum income need not necessarily lead to a labour supply of
zero hours if SA recipients are allowed to keep a substantial amount of additional
labour earnings. The second important feature of the present SA system therefore
concerns transfer withdrawal in case of supplementary labour earnings. At present, net
earnings up to 25 per cent of the basic SA rate are not withdrawn. Over net earnings
exceeding this amount, SA is withdrawn with a marginal transfer withdrawal rate
of 85 per cent, where the marginal transfer withdrawal rate measures the amount
of benefit lost when net earnings increase at the margin. The maximum net income
allowance which is not deducted from SA payments currently amounts to half of
the basic SA rate of the respective SA recipient. Figure 1 depicts the relationship
between gross earnings and disposable income for a single person without children1.
Assuming for simplicity an average SA minimum income of 600 C= per month, a zero
labour supply translates into a disposable income of 600 C=. With a basic SA rate of
300 C=, net earnings up to 75 C= are not withdrawn. Over additional earnings beyond
75 C= up to 575 C= (corresponding to gross income amounts of 75 C= and about 720 C=),
SA is phased out at a marginal rate of 85 per cent. Net earnings exceeding 575 C= are
subject to a transfer withdrawal rate of 100 per cent, since at 575 C= the maximum
allowance amounting to half of the basic SA rate (150 C=) is reached. Eligibility for
SA ranges up to net earnings of 750 C=, which correspond to gross earnings of about
950 C=. Figure 1 therefore illustrates that over a gross income range between 75 C=
and 950 C=, SA recipients face substantial transfer withdrawal rates which are likely
to discourage labour market participation.
1The calculation of net earnings and disposable income is described in more detail in Section
3.1.3 and in the appendix.
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Note: 15 and 30 hours refer to a weekly labour supply of a worker with a gross hourly
wage of 10.8 C=. For the details of the calculations of disposable income and net earnings
see Section 3.1.3 and the appendix.
Finally, to assess the quantitative relevance in terms of the number of persons
being affected by the disincentive effects of the present SA system, it is illustrative
to calculate the number of SA recipients who are able to work. At the end of 2001,
there were 2.7 million SA recipients. The so called "net employment potential" is
obtained by subtracting the number of persons older than 60 and younger than 18
years of age, ill and unemployable individuals, persons with family responsibilities and
those already employed or in training. According to this calculation, the employment
potential of SA recipients amounted to about 1 million persons in 2001 (Statistisches
Bundesamt 2002).
2.2 Reform Scenarios
The disincentive problems associated with the present system of SA have led to
several reform proposals aiming at increasing labour market participation of low-
income workers. What is common to the majority of the proposals is that they suggest
a reduction in effective marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution.
The effective marginal tax rate measures the overall marginal tax resulting from
income taxes, social security contributions as well as transfer withdrawal. These
reductions may either be achieved by wage subsidies similar to the US-American EITC
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(Earned Income Tax Credit) as proposed by Sinn et al. (2002), or by a reduction
in the marginal transfer withdrawal rate as put forward by the Scientific Council
of the Federal Economics Ministry (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 2002) or by Breyer et
al. (2004). The main problem with a reduction in the effective marginal tax rate
within low income ranges is that it must lead to a substantial increase in effective
marginal tax rates for higher income levels. Otherwise a reduction is likely to lead
to a considerable increase in the number of persons being entitled to wage subsidies
or SA payments and, as a consequence, to a substantial expansion of government
expenditures. To limit fiscal costs associated with a reform of the German SA system,
most of the reform proposals therefore suggest a simultaneous reduction in the SA
minimum level for those persons who are able to work. To avoid a cut in SA payments
for those persons who are able to work but do not find a job in the regular labour
market, proposals suggesting a substantial reduction in SA minimum income levels
generally include some form of communal work programs (Sinn et al. 2002, Ochel
2003, Breyer et al. 2004). These programs are typically designed to guarantee a
minimum income amounting to the former SA level.
To capture the main features of the reform proposals put forward in the recent
political discussion, we simulate on the one hand a substantial reduction in the SA
minimum income level associated with a considerable reduction in the transfer with-
drawal rate. As a variant, we simulate a moderate reduction in SA combined with
a less pronounced decrease in the marginal transfer withdrawal rate. Contrary to
the reform proposals put forward in the recent discussion, we do not account for any
communal work programs for those employable SA recipients who do not find a job
in the regular labour market2. The following sections describe the reform scenarios
in more detail.
2.2.1 Scenario 1
The first reform scenario suggests a substantial reduction in the SA level for those
welfare recipients who are able to work. More specifically, the scenario involves a
complete cut in the basic SA rate for those recipients belonging to the net employ-
ment potential. More detailed definition criteria of employability will be given in
Section 3.1.1. Simultaneously, the transfer withdrawal rate is cut to zero up to the
net earnings amount that is necessary to reach the status-quo SA level. I.e., a sin-
gle person without children, for example, may earn 300 C= net labour income that
is not withdrawn. Net earnings in excess of this amount are subject to a transfer
withdrawal rate of 50 per cent up to the breakeven income where net income corre-
sponds exactly to disposable income. For a single person without children, eligibility
for SA therefore extends up to net earnings of 900 C=. The transfer withdrawal rate
for non-employable single individuals remains the same as in the status-quo system,
2We justify this by assuming that the availability of public work jobs has no major impact on
the labour supply decision, which we are mainly interested in. Apparently, the neglect of public
work-programs which guarantee the former SA level for those individuals willing to work leads to
an overestimation of negative distributional effects.
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whereas employable partners of non-employable persons in couple households face a
lower transfer withdrawal rate.
2.2.2 Scenario 2
The second reform scenario suggests only a 50 per cent cut in the basic SA rate for
those SA recipients who are able to work. The transfer withdrawal rate is again
cut to zero up to the net earnings amount that is necessary to reach the status-
quo SA level. For a single person without children this implies that he or she may
earn 150 C= net labour income that is not withdrawn. Net earnings exceeding this
amount are subject to a transfer withdrawal rate of 70 per cent up to the breakeven
income where net income corresponds exactly to disposable income. Due to the more
generous SA level as compared to Scenario 1, a higher marginal transfer withdrawal
rate is necessary in Scenario 2 to restrict the income range where persons are entitled
to SA payments. For a single person without children, eligibility for SA now extends
up to a net income amount of about 800 C=. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship
between disposable income and gross labour income for the two reform scenarios for
a single person without children.
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Fig. 2:  Income function of a single without children in Scenarios 1 and 2
Note: 15 and 30 hours refer to a weekly labour supply of a worker with a gross hourly
wage of 10.8 C=. For the details of the calculations of disposable income and net earnings
see Section 3.1.3 and the appendix.
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3 Description of the CGE-Model
To simulate the reform scenarios that have been presented above, we use the CGE-
model PACE-L, which incorporates important institutional characteristics of the Ger-
man labour market. The following sections present a description of the labour market
module of PACE-L which models wage determination and labour supply. A more ex-
tensive model description and a summary of the data sources used for calibration can
be found in Böhringer et al. (2002) and Boeters et al. (2004).
3.1 Labour supply
3.1.1 The labour supply model
The aim of this section is to present the labour supply module of PACE-L. When
analysing the effects of tax-benefit reforms it is desirable to distinguish the effects
for individuals belonging to different household types. The reason is that individual
labour supply elasticities and the relevant budget constraints depend strongly on the
household type an individual belongs to. Couples and singles, for example, are subject
to different budget constraints due to marital income tax splitting. Another source
of household-specific budget constraints are SA payments that depend on household
size and composition as described in Section 2. To account for these heterogeneities,
the present model distinguishes 27 household types according to their age and skill
composition and to the household members’ flexibility of labour supply. There is one
representative household type containing household members with inflexible labour
supply3. The remaining 26 household types represent those households whose adult
members’ labour supply may be thought of as completely flexible. They are divided
into 10 single households and 16 couple households. More detailed defining criteria
are given in Table A1 in the appendix. Except for single parents with more than
one child and married women with more than one child, adult members of these
households are taken to be the relevant population being subject to changes in the
SA system as presented in Section 2. Single parents and married women with more
than one child are excluded since they are defined as not being able to work due to
child care responsibilities.
To determine hours of labour supplied, we employ a discrete choice model of
labour supply, i.e. each individual (single or adult member of a couple household)
can choose from a finite set of hours only. The adoption of this kind of model is
appropriate for several reasons: first, it provides a more realistic description of supply
choices open to individuals since the frequently invoked assumption that individuals
can freely choose the quantity of hours worked appears to be at odds with empirical
evidence suggesting that hours worked are rather concentrated at different discrete
3Those are defined as persons whose labour supply may be regarded as non-responsive to tax-
benefit policies. More specifically, this household type is meant to include at least one adult person
younger than 20 and older than 65 years, civil servants, retired and self-employed persons, individuals
being still in education or training, persons being in parental leave and individuals not residing in
private households.
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points. Second, discrete choice models allow for a straightforward distinction between
labour supply responses along the intensive and the extensive margin. Third, discrete
choice models facilitate the incorporation of a complex tax-benefit structure since the
budget constraint has to be determined for a finite set of hours only. According to the
empirically observed concentration of hours worked reported by Buslei and Steiner
(1999) for Germany, the present model distinguishes three working time categories
for married men and five options for married women and singles. The first of these
options is always a labour supply of zero hours. Table A2 in the appendix displays
the remaining working hours categories for all individuals.
Similar to Graafland et al. (2001, pp. 71-86), differences in labour supply be-
haviour are modelled by introducing heterogeneous preferences for desired hours of
work. Preferences of each household are characterised by a utility function that con-
sists of two additive parts. The first one is a CES part, which depends on leisure
and consumption, as in the standard neoclassical labour supply model. The second
part is linear in the absolute difference between actual and autonomously preferred
working time. Through the parameter of autonomously desired working time, we
generate heterogeneity within household types. Algebraically, the utility for single 
of household type  supplying labour in hours category  is given by
() =
·
 ( − )
−1
 + (1−  )()
−1

¸ 

−1
− 	(
¯¯
 − ¯
¯¯
)
 (1)
where : share parameter,  : time endowment, : working time in hours cat-
egory , : expected consumption corresponding to hours category .  would
correspond to the standard elasticity of substitution if the additive term were zero.
	 measures the disutility derived from a deviation of actual hours worked, , from
autonomously desired hours of work, ¯ The assumption that ¯ is heterogeneous
among individuals belonging to a particular household type  enables us to generate
differences in individual working hours that are actually supplied.
As regards the labour supply of couples, we assume that couples derive the fol-
lowing joint utility from hours combinations (
 

), where the individual spouses
are indexed by  and  and the superscripts  and  refer to women and men,
respectively:
	(


 

) =
"

³
(


 

)
´−1
 + (1−  )
³
(


 

)
´−1

# 
−1
−	 (
¯¯¯
 − ¯


¯¯¯
)− 	 (
¯¯
 − ¯	
¯¯
)
 (2)
(


 

) denotes joint leisure of the couple and is defined as
(


 

) =
³
 ( − 

) + (1− 

 )( − )
´

 (3)
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with  representing a weighting parameter for female leisure. (


 

) denotes
joint consumption which is derived from the total disposable household income. To
begin with, we describe the labour supply choice for singles according to eq. (1):
first we calculate the expected consumption level, ()
 which equals the expected
disposable income in working time category  under the German tax and transfer sys-
tem4. Disposable income has to be calculated as an expected value since we consider
three possible labour market states: employment, involuntary unemployment with
unemployment benefits and involuntary unemployment with SA. Thus, the values of
() are calculated as weighted averages of the disposable income in the three
labour market states, with the weights being the respective probabilities. These cal-
culations will be described in more detail in Section 3.1.3. Having calculated ()

we are able to determine the CES utility part, 
 
 for each hours of work option,
which is independent of the idiosyncratic parameter ¯ For given values of 
 we
can determine critical values of ¯ for individuals who are just indifferent between
two adjacent working time classes. These critical values separate those individuals
who work in the lower hours of work category from those who work in the upper
category. We denote the critical value of ¯ where an individual in household type  is
just indifferent between hours of work category  and  + 1 by ¯+1 and calculate
it as
¯+1 =
 + +1
2
+

 ()− 
 (+1)
2	
 (4)
From eq. (4) it can be seen that the critical value of ¯ is determined by the length
of the interval between two categories and the difference between the CES utility
levels corresponding to the adjacent working time categories. A change in the tax
and transfer system will change disposable income and consumption corresponding
to different working time categories. This bears on the CES utilities and thus the
relative attractiveness of the different working time options. The critical values of ¯
adjust, and, depending on the distribution of the ¯ within the household types, so
do the frequencies of the different working time categories. From equation (4) it can
also be recognised that, as 	 approaches infinity, changes in disposable incomes have
no impact on ¯+1, as the disutility associated with a difference between actual and
autonomously preferred working time outweighs any utility gain derived from higher
disposable income levels.
For couple households, working time is determined in an analogous manner. As
the labour supply choice of men is open to three working time options and the choice
of women is open to five categories, couples may choose among 15 different combi-
nations of female and male working hours (
 

). However, as the simultaneous
maximisation of female and male working hours would result in discontinuous reac-
tions of the households, we make the simplifying assumption that each partner chooses
his or her optimal working time under the assumption that disposable income and
joint leisure corresponding to a particular category of hours of work supplied equal
4Although consumption must be thought of as an expected value, we suppress expectation oper-
ators for the sake of expositional convenience.
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their expected values given the conditional benchmark probabilities of hours of work
categories of the respective partner. Thus, the simultaneous maximisation problem
reduces to two distinct maximisation problems similar to the single case. The relevant
utility function for a wife  of household type , for example, becomes
(

) =
"

³b()´−1 + (1−  )³ b()´−1
# 
−1
−	 (
¯¯¯
 − ¯


¯¯¯
)− 	 (
¯¯¯b − ¯	 ¯¯¯)
 (5)
where b() , b() and b are the expected values of joint leisure, consump-
tion and hours of work given the benchmark probabilities of hours of work categories
open to the wife’s spouse. The calculation of those expected values will be explained
in more detail in Section 3.1.3.
3.1.2 Calibration of the labour supply module
The model described in Section 3.1.1 is calibrated to reflect empirical labour supply
elasticities so as to produce empirically relevant policy simulations. To calibrate the
model, we use output from the ZEW’s microsimulation model (Buslei and Steiner
1999, Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus 2003) to generate elasticities that are suited to
serve as a benchmark for the labour supply module. The microsimulation model uses
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and estimates probabilities of
choosing different hours of work categories by a multinomial logit model. The esti-
mations are based on a subsample covering those households whose adult members’
labour supply may be thought of as completely flexible. This sample represents about
15.4 million households and 24 million individuals. We gain four sets of parameters
from this model: (1) the overall distribution of household types, (2) the classification
of hours of work as given in Table A2, (3) the empirical distribution of household
labour supply across these hours of work categories for each of the 26 household
types and finally (4) the simulated partial own-price elasticities of labour supply in
a given working time category with respect to the gross wage in this category. These
elasticities are documented in Table A3 in the appendix. They are to be read as
follows: given that the gross wage for the first positive time category for men (38
hours per week) rises by ten per cent, the probability for married men in "CLL0K"
couples to supply 38-hours-per-week labour will rise by 1.51 percentage points.
In order to account for the empirical distribution of labour supply into different
labour supply categories, we assume that the autonomous working time preference
parameter ¯ is distributed over the interval [0,70] in a stepwise uniform distribution5.
The steps in the density functions are assumed to coincide with the benchmark crit-
ical values of ¯, which delimit the individuals who fall into the different working
hours categories. Expressed differently, we assume that the preference parameters of
5The interval is based on the assumption of a maximum time endowment of 70 hours.
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all individuals working  hours are uniformly distributed between the benchmark
values of ¯−1 and ¯+1 Given the value of the density over this interval, we
are then able to determine the share of persons choosing a particular working time
category. The assumption of a stepwise uniform distribution of ¯ enables an exact
reproduction of the empirically observed working hours distribution. To calibrate the
model so as to reproduce the elasticities simulated by the microsimulation model,
we match the empirical elasticities with the algebraical elasticity values that may be
obtained from our underlying preferences as represented by eqs. (1) and (2)6. Table
A3 in the appendix compares the elasticities that result from our calibration proce-
dure with the simulated elasticities from the microsimulation model. The reported
elasticities reveal that our model is fairly good in approximating the overall level
of labour supply reactions. However, as regards the ranking of the elasticities with
respect to the individual working time categories, it turns out to be rather inflexible.
Here a further model development is desirable. Having calibrated the parameters of
our model, we are finally able to simulate how changes in the tax-benefit system will
affect the working hours distribution. As shown in eq. (4), changes in taxes and
benefits affect the critical values of  Given the calibrated density functions, which
are held constant in the counterfactual, changes in the critical values of 
 in turn,
translate into a new working hours distribution.
3.1.3 The Budget Constraint
Modelling labour supply as the outcome of a discrete choice model has the advantage
that the budget constraint has to be determined for a finite set of hours only. In order
to determine the budget constraint, it is necessary to calculate disposable incomes for
each hours category. As disposable incomes may consist of net earnings resulting from
positive labour supply as well as transfer payments, the German tax-benefit system
has to be incorporated in the present modelling framework. The present section
provides a description of the determination of disposable incomes and the features
of the status-quo German tax-benefit system that are accounted for in the following
analysis.
First, we calculate net earnings per month by deducting income taxes and social
security contributions from gross monthly earnings. The details of these calculations
are reported in the appendix. The disposable monthly income is obtained by adding
transfer payments to net monthly labour earnings. Apart from SA, the most important
transfer payments in Germany include unemployment benefits ("Arbeitslosengeld"),
unemployment assistance ("Arbeitslosenhilfe"), housing benefits ("Wohngeld") and
child benefits ("Kindergeld"). In the present model, we account for unemployment
benefits and assistance, social assistance and child benefits7, while housing benefits
are neglected. In Germany, unemployment benefits (UB) are available for persons
6Readers who are interested in the derivation of the algebraical elasticities are referred to Boeters
et al. (2004) which provides a more detailed description of the modelling framework and the under-
lying calibrations.
7At present, child benefits amount to 154 C= per month for the first, second and third child and
to 179 C= per month from the fourth child on.
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who have paid contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance for a mini-
mum of one year. The duration of UB depends on the unemployed person’s former
labour market experience and age. The monthly amount received equals a constant
fraction of previous net monthly earnings. At present, the replacement rate for per-
sons without children is 60 per cent and for persons with children 67 per cent. UB are
not means-tested. In terms of the present model, this implies for couple households
that the entitlement to UB is completely independent of the labour or transfer income
received by the respective spouse.
For those persons who do not have enough experience to obtain UB or who have
exhausted their benefits unemployment assistance (UA) and SA become relevant.
The replacement rate for UA payments for persons without children is 53 per cent
and for persons with children 57 per cent. In contrast to UB, both welfare payments
are means-tested, i.e payments are reduced if either the unemployed person or re-
maining household members receive other incomes. While UA is only available for
those persons who have exhausted their UB, eligibility for SA does not require any
former entitlement to UB. Persons eligible for UB or UA payments may be entitled to
additional SA payments as long as UB or UA transfers fall short of the specified SA
minimum income. Since the focus of the following simulations will be on a reform of
SA, our model does take into account the means-tested nature of SA payments, but
neglects the means-tested nature of UA payments. To incorporate the different trans-
fer components in our model, we proceed as follows: first, we assign SA payments to
all voluntarily unemployed singles and to those couple households whose adult mem-
bers are both voluntarily unemployed8. Second, for positive hours of labour supply
we distinguish three labour market states: a person who supplies a positive number of
hours worked may be employed, which will be denoted as state (). If the individual
does not find a job and becomes involuntarily unemployed, he or she may either be
entitled to UB or UA () or receive SA payments (). However, owing to the static
nature of the model, we are not able to determine the entitlement to UB or UA due to
former contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance. Instead, we assume
that a person who becomes unemployed is entitled to UB or UA with an exogenous
given probability  and receives SA payments with probability (1 − ). In the
former case, UB and UA payments are then determined by the replacement ratio
of net earnings that correspond to the chosen category of hours of labour supplied.
More specifically, this replacement ratio is defined as a weighted average of UB and
UA replacement rates where the weights are the respective shares of entitled persons
who receive those benefits. SA payments, in contrast, do not depend on the category
of hours supplied in the labour market. However, at this point it is important to note
that due to the means-tested nature of SA payments, the entitlement of spouses to
SA depends on labour or transfer income of the respective partner.
8For each household type, we split up those individuals that actually do not work into voluntarily
and involuntarily unemployed in order to obtain household specific unemployment rates and non-
participation rates. The shares of involuntarily unemployed persons are calibrated so as to match
the resulting aggregate skill-specific unemployment rates with their empirical values in 2000 (IAB
2002).
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To illustrate the interdependence of labour and transfer incomes, Tables 2 and
3 summarise the different components of disposable income, 
 for positive hours
supplied in different labour market states for singles and couples, respectively9. Note
that Table 2 not only applies to singles, but also to couple households with one
non-participating partner, whereas Table 3 only applies to those couples with both
partners participating in the labour market.
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Table 2: Components of disposable income of single participating individuals in different labour market states
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      Table 3: Components of disposable income of two participating individuals in different labour market states
In Tables 2 and 3,  denotes net income,  represents social assistance and
 denotes unemployment compensation comprising UB and UA. In Table 3, the
subscripts  and  represent labour or transfer incomes for husbands and wives,
respectively. The entries in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that SA payments may also be
available for households receiving positive labour earnings provided that total house-
hold income does not exceed the respective income allowances as described in Section
2. Households receiving transfer payments from other sources may also be eligible for
SA, if transfers from other sources are smaller than the specified minimum income
level. The fact that SA payments depend on total household income is indicated by
the income arguments in (), which determine the level of SA.
The imposition of three labour market states requires that the value of dispos-
able income for a particular category of positive working time be calculated as an
9In the following, the subscript  denoting the household type and hours of work as arguments
determing the level of  will be dropped for convenience.
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expected value. For singles, e.g., the expected value of the disposable income for a
particular category of hours of work supplied is determined as a weighted average of
the disposable income values in the three labour market states ()
 () and (), with
the weights being the respective probabilities,  ()
  = 
 
 :
(()) =
X
=
 () (
 )
   0 (6)
More specifically, we have  () = (1− )
  () = 	 and  () = (1− 	)
 with
 representing the (household type specific) unemployment rate and 	 denoting
the probability that an unemployed person is entitled to UB or UA10. For couples,
the expected disposable income for a particular combination of hours of work is
determined by the weighted average of disposable incomes corresponding to the 9
combinations of labour market states:
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 represent the probabilities of male and female labour
states and are defined as above. As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, we make the sim-
plifying assumption that spouses decide on their optimal working time based on the
average disposable income that results from the different hours categories open to
the other spouse. I.e., the expected disposable income determining the expected
consumption level for a particular category of hours worked in eq. (5) is given by
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with e.g.  (

 

 ) (


) denoting the probability that the husband supplies 


hours of work, conditional upon 
 hours of work supplied by his wife.
To approximate the tax-transfer schedule, we derive from the calculations of the
disposable income an average and an effective marginal rate of the total tax and
transfer effects for each household type, hours-of work category and labour market
state. Deviations from the benchmark gross income that occur in general equilibrium
are taxed with the effective marginal effect of the tax and transfer system locally
determined at the benchmark.
10For  we posit a value of 0.8, which is household independent and corresponds to the share of
unemployed persons receiving unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance as reported by
IAB (2002).
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3.2 Union wage bargaining
Embedding the process of wage determination in our general equilibrium framework is
a crucial element for the evaluation of social welfare reforms since it enables us to take
into account the repercussions of a welfare reform on equilibrium wages. In PACE-L,
wages are determined by sector-specific bargaining between an employers’ association
and a trade union. The bargaining outcome is modelled as the maximisation of a Nash
function, which includes the objective functions of both parties and their respective
fallback options. We adopt the “right to manage” approach: parties bargain over
wages, and firms afterwards decide over labour demand given the bargained wage.
This labour demand reaction in turn is anticipated in the wage bargaining. The firms’
objective is their profit, while the fallback option is no production and, thus, zero
profits. The union represents two types of workers, high-skilled and low-skilled. For
each sector  and skill type , the union’s objective function, Γ, is employment,

 times the value of a job, 
 minus the value of unemployment, 	:
Γ =  ( − 	) (10)
Following the search literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 1990),  and 	 are cal-
culated as value functions. Both can be expressed as weighted averages of labour
incomes and transfer payments. The weights are determined through the respective
probabilities of employment and unemployment in the future, given the equilibrium
transition probabilities between the two labour market states. We then calculate
the steady state values of the two labour market states under the assumption that
job-seekers must be indifferent between any two of the sectors11. As usual in dual-
labour-market type models, this results in the relation that the higher the “surplus
from working” is, the lower the quit rate from unemployment must be (see Acemoglu
2001).
We assume that the trade union is utilitaristic with respect to the different house-
hold types. The marginal tax rates determining the change in net wages as well
as the values of the states of employment and unemployment that appear in eq.
(10) are therefore calculated as weighted averages over all household types and all
hours of work categories. In turn, the general equilibrium wage that results from
the bargaining process is used to derive the income positions of all households in
all possible labour market states. Deviations from the benchmark gross income are
taxed with the total marginal effect of the tax and transfer system locally deter-
mined at the benchmark. The two labour markets for low and high-skilled labour
are balanced by aggregating on the demand side over sectors and on the supply side
over household types (where frequencies of household types are fixed). We assume
that the structure of labour input (with respect to household types) is uniform across
sectors. Household-specific unemployment rates are aggregated into economy-wide
unemployment per skill group. Changes in aggregate unemployment are distributed
among household types proportional to their benchmark unemployment.
11For a more detailed description of the wage bargaining module see Böhringer et al. (2002) and
Boeters et al. (2004).
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4 Expected economic effects
4.1 Labour supply
The following sections discuss the economic effects that may be expected from a
reform of the German SA system in terms of our modelling framework. As discussed
earlier, changes in the tax and benefit system as induced by the reform scenarios
presented in Section 2 affect the distribution of labour supply across different options
of working time via their impact on changes in the critical values of the autonomous
preference parameter ¯
 which determine the shares of individuals choosing different
working time options. This change depends largely on the difference between the CES-
components of the household utility function corresponding to different working time
categories. The relative attractiveness of different working time categories therefore
results from the difference in leisure as well as disposable household incomes and
their relative evaluation as determined by the underlying parameters of the utility
function, 
  and 	. These parameters determine the elasticities of labour supply in
a given working time category with respect to the gross wage in this category. Table
A3 in the appendix documents that empirical as well as calibrated elasticities are
always non-negative12. Given these elasticities, one may expect the increase in the
share of individuals choosing a particular working time category to become larger, the
larger (smaller) the change in the income difference with respect to the lower (higher)
working time category. For a low-skilled single person without children, Figures 1 and
2 illustrate the relative income positions of 0 and 15 hours of labour supply. Whereas
under the status-quo system an increase in labour supply from 0 to 15 hours translates
into an incremental disposable income of roughly 100 C=, the reform scenarios 1 and 2
involve an increase in disposable income of about 430 C= or 270 C=, respectively. As can
also be seen from Figures 1 and 2, the relative income position of 30 hours exhibits
only a slight improvement as compared to 15 hours, whereas the relative income
position of 30 and 38 hours of labour supply remains unchanged. As a consequence,
we expect increases in the share of singles without children choosing 15 hours and 30
hours of labour supply and decreases in the probability of zero hours of labour supply,
with the changes being larger in Scenario 1. As female singles without children feature
larger elasticities than their male counterparts, we expect all reactions to be more
pronounced for single women.
12To check how well our calibrated elasticities reproduce simulations derived by the underlying
microsimulation model, we simulate a stylised policy scenario taking the form of a ten per cent cut in
the SA minimum income as simulated by Buslei and Steiner (1999). While Buslei and Steiner (1999)
report increases in labour supply measured in hours of 0.27 per cent for male singles, 0.12 per cent
for female singles, 0.21 per cent for married men and 0.07 per cent for married women, we obtain
corresponding figures of 0.08, 0.43, 0.21 and 0.09 per cent. Although our simulations do not preserve
the ranking of the effects for singles, we believe that our model is able to reproduce the overall
magnitude of the partial equilibrium labour supply effects obtained by the microsimulation model
quite well. In this regard, it has to be emphasised that PACE-L and the underlying microsimulation
model are not directly comparable as they rely on different fomulations of the budget constraints:
while in PACE-L voluntarily unemployed individuals are bound to receive SA, in Buslei and Steiner
(1999) voluntarily unemployed individuals may additionally receive UA or UB.
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4.2 Wage formation and employment
When discussing the impact of the reform scenarios on wage formation, the main
focus will be on the unionised labour market environment as presented in Section 3.2,
since this model appears to provide a fairly realistic description of German labour
market institutions. The imposition of any welfare reform raises the question of how
negotiated wages will respond to these reforms. In this regard, the repercussions
of the above discussed reform scenarios on the bargaining process operate through
two different channels. First, as the reforms suggest a decrease in the marginal
transfer withdrawal rate with the remaining income tax system being unchanged,
both scenarios give rise to a reduction in the effective marginal tax rate at the bottom
of the income distribution. However, as under both reform scenarios SA eligibility
may extend to higher incomes levels, the effective marginal tax rate may increase for
incomes between the status-quo and the reform breakeven income. Whether average
skill-specific effective marginal tax rates decrease or increase largely depends on the
underlying household and hours of work distribution, since the effective marginal
tax rates being taken into account by an utilitaristic union are based on weighted
averages over all household types and all hours of work categories. With a constant
average tax rate, an increase in the effective marginal tax rate raises the degree
of tax progression. According to the theoretical literature, this will lead to wage
moderation on behalf of unions (see Koskela and Vilmunen 1996). Second, both
reform scenarios have an adverse effect on the fall-back position of unions which stems
from two different sources: on the one hand, by stimulating labour supply both reform
scenarios reduce the value of unemployment as the probability of unemployment at
given labour demand increases. On the other hand, cuts in the SA payments lower
the expected income when being unemployed. In sum, the negative impact on the
fall-back position of unions is likely to translate into lower union wages.
5 Simulation results
5.1 Partial labour supply effects
The following results focus on the labour supply reactions with constant wages. More-
over, we consider no balancing of the government budget surplus or deficit induced by
our simulated policies. To compare our predictions from Section 4.1 with the numeri-
cal simulation results, Table 4 exemplifies the labour supply responses for low-skilled
female and male singles without children. The figures reported in Table 4 reveal that
the results are in accordance with the expected effects that have been discussed in
Section 4.1. In particular, we do observe increases in the share of low-skilled singles
without children choosing 15 hours and 30 hours of labour supply and decreases in the
share of the zero hours category, with the changes generally being larger in Scenario
1. Moreover, the labour supply reactions turn out to be considerably stronger for
single women due to their higher labour supply elasticities. In sum, in Scenario 1 (2),
the changing hours distributions result in an increase in participation rates by 1.64
(0.76) percentage points for men and by 9.19 (4.23) percentage points for women,
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respectively.
Hours
category
Benchmark
share single
men
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Benchmark
share single
women
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
0 0.1321 0.1157 0.1245 0.2463 0.1544 0.2040
15 0.0492 0.0655 0.0567 0.2274 0.3100 0.2654
30 0.0062 0.0063 0.0062 0.0592 0.0679 0.0629
38 0.6309 0.6307 0.6308 0.2990 0.2989 0.2991
49 (47) 0.1816 0.1819 0.1817 0.1682 0.1688 0.1685
                                      Table 4: Hours distribution singles without children
Source: Own calculations.
While Table 4 was confined to low-skilled singles without children, Table 5 presents
the aggregate effects on participation rates, average working time and supplied hours
of work for different types of individuals. The terms in brackets apply to the effects of
Scenario 2. The aggregate effects depend on the magnitudes of the household-specific
labour supply elasticities and the overall distribution of household types. Compared
to the participation reactions of low-skilled singles without children, the aggregate
increase in participation rates of singles turns out to be less pronounced since low-
skilled singles without children constitute a relatively small proportion in the overall
household distribution. In Table 5, average working time effects refer to the working
time of those individuals who supply positive hours of work, while the effect on labour
supply represents the overall effect on labour supply measured in hours of work. In
our scenarios, positive changes in participation rates generally reduce average working
time. The reason is that our modelling framework restricts individuals formerly not
participating in the labour market to switch to the adjacent working time category,
involving an amount of hours supplied that is always below the average. This is
particularly relevant for married women whose decrease in average working time is
found to be considerably larger than that of married men. Moreover, the relative
attractiveness of higher working time categories as compared to lower categories is
not improved by our reform scenarios, which unambiguously reduces average working
time of those individuals supplying positive hours of work. In sum, the overall effect
on supplied hours of work always turns out to be positive since the decrease in average
working time is dominated by the increase in participation rates.
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Individual type: Couple
men
Couple
women
Singles Low-
skilled
High-
skilled
All
REFORM  SCENARIO 1 (SCENARIO 2)
Participation rate (change in
percentage points)
0.8747
(0.4301)
0.8335
(0.4867)
2.3922
(1.0852)
1.8818
(0.9262)
1.1831
(0.5841)
1.2854
(0.6342)
Average working time
(change in per cent)
-0.1128
(-0.0510)
-0.7826
(-0.4459)
-1.6025
(-0.7280)
-0.1559
(-0.0676)
-0.1055
(-0.0481)
-0.7409
(-0.3620)
Labour supply measured in
hours (change in per cent)
0.8240
(0.4100)
0.3646
(0.2147)
0.9849
(0.4608)
1.2242
(0.5940)
0.6915
(0.3458)
0.7555
(0.3756)
Additional labour supply in
1000 persons
66.3
(32.7)
243.2
(120)
309.5
(152.7)
Budget (Tax revenue minus
transfer expenditures –
change in per cent)
3.7854
(2.2947)
Table 5: Effects on labour supply at constant wages
Source: Own calculations.
The results in Table 5 indicate that in both reform scenarios, the effects on labour
supply are more pronounced among single households than among couple households.
One important reason is that couple households are less likely to be affected by the
reform since they exhibit a larger share of households with more than one child,
who face a relatively smaller reduction in the basic SA rate. As regards couples in
Scenario 1, we obtain smaller increases in participation rates for women than for
men. Interestingly, this result is reversed under Scenario 213. However, despite the
larger increase in female participation rates the overall increase in supplied hours of
work of married women is lower in Scenario 2 due the more pronounced decrease in
average working time. Moreover, participation responses of low-skilled individuals are
stronger than the reactions of high-skilled individuals. The mechanism behind this
result is that low-skilled workers are more likely to be affected by the disincentives of
13These different reactions are due to different working time categories open to couple men and
women. While couple men are bound to switch from non-participation to a full-time 38 hours job,
couple women are restricted to switch to lower working time categories (see Table A2). The fact
that switching from non-participation to a 38-hours job instead to a 9.5-hours job entails a relatively
higher income difference leads to relatively stronger male participation reactions. However, the
difference between the change in the relative attractiveness of the lowest working time category
for men and women is lower under Scenario 2. This is because both scenarios involve virtually no
transfer withdrawal in the lowest female working time category, while Scenario 2 implies a lower cut
in the basic SA rate, thereby inducing a smaller increase in male disposable income. Together this
leads to relatively lower participation reactions of couple men in Scenario 2.
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the status-quo system. Finally, as expected, the effects of Scenario 1 turn out to be
stronger than in Scenario 2. Measured in persons, Scenario 1 involves an additional
labour supply of about 310.000 persons as compared to about 153.000 additional
persons in Scenario 2. As high-skilled labour represents a considerably larger fraction
of our relevant population (85.4 per cent), the additional labour supply of high-
skilled workers exceeds that of low-skilled labour in absolute terms. With respect
to the government budget, both scenarios entail an increase in the surplus of tax
revenue over transfer expenditures which stems both from lower SA payments and
higher income tax revenues and social security contributions.
5.2 General equilibrium
Tables 6a and 6b present the general equilibrium effects on labour supply and em-
ployment.
Individual type: Couple
men
Couple
women
Singles Low-
skilled
High-
skilled
All
REFORM  SCENARIO 1
Participation rate (change in
percentage points)
0.8420 0.7820 2.3770 1.8416 1.1496 1.2509
Average working time
(change in per cent)
-0.1158 -0.7480 -1.6033 -0.1583 -0.1086 -0.7326
Labour supply measured in
hours (change in per cent)
0.7859 0.3396 0.9682 1.1798 0.6653 0.7270
Additional labour supply in
1000 persons
64.9 236.3 301.2
Budget (Tax revenue minus
transfer expenditures –
change in per cent)
0.9632
Marginal income tax
recycling (change
in percentage points )
-0.18
Effective marginal tax rate
(change in percentage
points)
0.9693 0.6870
Gross wage (change in per
cent)
-2.2012 -1.2945
Additional employment in
1000 persons
51 221.9 272.9
Unemployment  rate (change
in percentage points)
-0.7079 -0.0631
Table 6a: General equilibrium  effects on labour supply, wages and employment Scenario 1
Source: Own calculations.
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These effects take into account the general equilibrium wage responses as well
as the labour demand reactions. The change in the budget surplus is recycled by a
uniform cut in the marginal income tax. This reduction turns out to be stronger in
Scenario 1 as compared to Scenario 2 due to the larger change in the budget surplus.
Individual type: Couple
men
Couple
women
Singles Low-
skilled
High-
skilled
All
REFORM  SCENARIO 2
Participation rate (change in
percentage points)
0.4161 0.4716 1.0830 0.9109 0.5737 0.6231
Average working time
(change in per cent)
-0.0509 -0.4344 -0.7328 -0.0688 -0.0479 -0.3602
Labour supply measured in
hours (change in per cent)
0.3949 0.2083 0.4538 0.5718 0.3369 0.3651
Additional labour supply in
1000 persons
32.1 117.9 150
Budget (Tax revenue minus
transfer expenditures –
change in per cent)
0.8062
Effective marginal tax rate
(change in percentage
points)
1.1293 0.0872
Marginal income tax
recycling (change in
percentage points )
-0.14
Gross wage (change in per
cent)
-1.2348 -0.6387
Additional employment in
1000 persons
24.9 110.2 135.1
Unemployment  rate (change
in percentage points)
-0.4333 -0.0266
Table 6b: General equilibrium effects on labour supply, wages and employment Scenario 2
Source: Own calculations.
Compared to the partial labour supply effects, the figures reveal that in general
equilibrium, the labour supply responses tend to be mitigated due to the negative
impact the reforms have on wages. In this regard, both scenarios involve a stronger
downward pressure on low-skilled wages than on high-skilled wages. The economic
mechanisms driving this result are threefold: first, both reform scenarios entail a more
pronounced increase in participation rates of low-skilled as compared to high-skilled
labour. Second, as can be seen from Tables 6a and 6b, both reform scenarios raise
the effective marginal tax rates of low-skilled workers to a larger extent than those of
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high-skilled workers. Based on the tax progression argument, this leads to stronger
wage moderation on behalf of low-skilled workers. Third, in all sectors, firms can
be shown to feature higher labour demand elasticities for low-skilled than for high-
skilled workers. Since these elasticities measure the union’s cost of a wage increase
in terms of foregone employment, the incentive for unions to lower wages is relatively
larger for low-skilled labour. Note, however, that despite the larger response of low-
skilled wages, the extent to which increases in participation rates are offset in general
equilibrium turns out to be larger for high-skilled labour than for low-skilled labour.
While participation rates of low-skilled labour are found to be reduced by 2.1 per cent
(1.7 per cent in Scenario 2), participation rates of high-skilled workers decrease by 2.8
per cent (1.8 per cent in Scenario 2) as compared to the partial equilibrium reactions.
This may be explained by the fact, that our underlying labour supply elasticities
for high-skilled workers are generally larger than those for low-skilled workers (see
Table A3 in the appendix). In sum, the general equilibrium effects confirm our
theoretical predictions from Section 4.2. However, the figures suggest that the feed-
back effects on labour supply resulting from general equilibrium wage effects appear to
be rather small. Note that this may to a small extent be attributed to lower income
taxes owing to our underlying income tax recycling, which tends to offset adverse
labour supply effects brought about by the wage reductions. As regards the effects
on employment, the wage reductions translate into lower unemployment rates. As the
ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled wages increases, unemployment rates of low-skilled
workers decrease by more percentage points than those of high-skilled labour. In
absolute terms, the general equilibrium simulations predict an additional employment
of about 272.000 (135.000) persons. These figures indicate that under Scenario 1 the
expected increase in employment may be substantial, while the employment effects
under Scenario 2 appear to be rather modest. The higher employment under Scenario
1 comes at the cost of a substantial reduction in SA payments for those individuals
who become involuntarily unemployed and are not entitled to UB or UA. Note that
this distributional problem stems from the fact that we did not take into account the
possibility of a guaranteed income in communal work programs for those employable
SA recipients who do not find a job in the regular labour market. With this omission,
our simulated labour supply effects are likely to be underestimated, since the expected
income when supplying positive hours of work would be larger with a guaranteed
income from a public-work job. However, provided that employment in a communal
work program entails a considerably larger disutility of work than a job in the regular
labour market, this downward bias is likely to be mitigated.
6 Conclusions
We have used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the effective-
ness of recent social welfare reform proposals in terms of their impact on labour supply
and unemployment. Our simulations included a cut in the SA minimum income level
associated with a reduction in the marginal transfer withdrawal rate. Before sum-
marising our numerical results there are several caveats to be kept in mind: first, our
specification of the budget constraint relies on the assumption that all voluntarily
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unemployed persons are restricted to the receipt of SA payments and are not entitled
to UB or UA payments. In practice, this is likely to be violated as one may expect a
considerable number of UB or UA recipients to be voluntarily unemployed. The fact
that this feature is missing in our modelling strategy is likely to lead to an overesti-
mation of the employment effects, since voluntarily unemployed UB or UA recipients
are - at least in the short run - not affected by changes in the SA system. Second,
we neglected communal work programs leading to a guaranteed minimum income for
those employable SA recipients who do not find a job in the regular labour market.
With this omission, our simulated labour supply effects are presumably slightly un-
derestimated. In sum, we expect the downward bias through the last effect to be
quantitatively less important than the first effect.
Summing up the numerical simulation results, our analysis has produced plausi-
ble effects that are qualitatively in line with the numerical results obtained by former
microsimulation studies (see e.g. Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus 2003). As expected,
labour supply effects are found to be relatively larger for low-skilled individuals since
they are more likely to be affected by the disincentives of the present status-quo sys-
tem. Moreover, the reactions among couple households turn out be less pronounced
than participation responses among single households since the latter exhibit a smaller
share of households with more than one child which face lower cuts in SA payments.
For both reform scenarios, the feed-back effects on labour supply resulting from gen-
eral equilibrium wage effects are found to be rather modest. This is particularly
true for low-skilled workers who feature lower labour supply elasticities than high-
skilled workers. Both reform proposals entail a slight decrease in unemployment
which amounts to less than one percentage point. This result suggests that the union
wage reactions are sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply translating
into higher unemployment. Primarily due to the higher increase in low-skilled labour
market participation, wages and unemployment rates of low-skilled workers are re-
duced to a larger extent as compared to high-skilled workers. The main lesson from
the numerical simulations is that substantial employment effects are to be expected
only from major cuts in welfare payments associated with a significant reduction in
transfer withdrawal rates.
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A Appendix
A.1 Classification of household types
Abbreviation Definition
CLLxK*) Couple, woman low-skilled, man low-skilled, x children
CLHxK Couple, woman low-skilled, man high-skilled, x children
CHLxK Couple, woman high-skilled, man low-skilled, x children
CHHxK Couple, woman high-skilled, man high-skilled, x children
ML0 Male single, low-skilled, no children
MH0 Male single, high-skilled, no children
WL0 Female single, low-skilled, no children
WH0 Female single, high-skilled, no children
yKL*) Single (male or female), low-skilled, y children
yKH Single (male or female), high-skilled, y children
 *) x =0 1,2,3;    y = 1,2,3. x, y = 3 refer to households with more than 2 children.
Low-skilled labour:  persons without any formal vocational training
High-skilled labour: persons holding a vocational or university degree
                                                 Table A1: Household disaggregation
A.2 Classification of hours of work categories
Individuals Hours options
men, married 0 38 49
men, single 0 15 30 38 49
women, single 0 15 30 38 47
women, married 0 9,5 24 38 47
        Table A2: Discrete working hours by household types
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A.3 Labour supply elasticities
             Elasticities couple men Elasticities couple women and singlesHousehold
1(e)1) 1(c)1) 2(e) 2(c) 1(e) 1(c) 2(e) 2(c) 3(e) 3(c) 4(e) 4(c)
CLL0K2) 1.51 1.83 1.67 1.02 0.07 0.25 0.56 0.29 0.76 0.75 0.29 0.50
CLH0K 4.14 5.15 4.81 3.26 0.19 0.67 1.33 0.90 1.72 1.52 0.82 0.76
CHL0K 3.32 4.27 4.06 2.77 0.22 0.42 1.46 1.45 2.44 2.25 1.56 1.23
CHH0K 3.61 4.60 4.58 3.14 0.20 0.57 1.33 1.42 2.28 2.39 1.53 1.14
CLL1K 1.27 1.62 1.72 1.04 0.05 0.29 0.37 0.27 0.28 0.42 0.07 0.21
CLH1K 3.41 3.44 4.64 3.07 0.15 0.76 0.93 0.69 0.84 0.59 0.25 0.19
CHL1K 2.55 3.47 3.82 2.69 0.25 0.51 1.00 0.74 1.04 0.74 0.36 0.27
CHH1K 3.43 4.45 4.69 3.24 0.24 0.88 1.23 1.24 1.50 1.31 0.73 0.48
CLL2K 1.44 1.79 1.86 1.30 0.06 0.47 0.57 0.15 0.58 0.08 0.23 0.02
CLH2K 2.49 3.43 3.70 2.18 0.13 0.66 0.77 0.44 0.65 0.28 0.21 0.07
CHL2K 2.04 2.78 3.12 2.03 0.14 0.45 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.57 0.17 0.16
CHH2K 3.79 4.85 5.09 3.61 0.26 0.91 1.03 0.90 1.13 0.75 0.53 0.26
CLL3K 1.00 0.55 1.50 1.53 0.06 0.47 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.001
CLH3K 2.69 3.56 3.79 2.62 0.06 0.69 0.43 0.31 0.22 0.14 0.05 0
CHL3K 2.49 2.57 2.94 2.75 0.18 0.85 1.06 0.45 1.15 0 0.39 0
CHH3K 4.23 5.42 5.62 3.83 0.25 0.81 0.89 1.01 0.83 0.66 0.32 0.06
ML0 - - - - - 0.04 - 0.81 1.54 1.75 1.98 0.88
MH0 - - - - - 0.02 - 0.84 1.55 1.80 2.09 0.94
WL0 - - - - 0.43 0.50 2.15 2.04 3.08 3.09 1.61 1.75
WH0 - - - - 0.38 0.14 2.34 2.44 3.28 3.88 3.08 1.84
1KL - - - - 0.29 0.10 1.16 1.17 1.64 1.80 1.14 0.80
1KH - - - - 0.31 0.26 1.88 2.13 2.41 2.58 1.87 1.15
2KL - - - - 0.09 0.23 0.09 0 0.80 0.62 0.83 0
2KH - - - - 0.19 0.36 1.48 1.96 1.97 1.85 1.62 0.65
3KL - - - - 0.06 0.35 0.18 0 0.93 0 0.54 0
3KH - - - - 0.06 0.21 0.43 0 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.49
   Table A3: Partial labour supply elasticities
1): 1, 2, 3, 4: positive working time categories; (e) empirical value, (c) calibrated value.
2): For abbreviations see Table A1.
A.4 Calculation of net earnings
Gross monthly earnings are obtained by multiplying the gross hourly wage with
monthly hours of work corresponding to the respective category of weekly labour
supply. For low-skilled labour we impute a gross hourly wage of about 10.8 C=, while
the gross hourly wage for high-skilled workers is assumed to amount to 14.3 C=. Both
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wages represent the average gross hourly wages for the respective qualification lev-
els of the subpopulation represented by our 26 household types as reported by the
German SOEP for the year 2000. Low-skilled workers are defined as persons without
any formal vocational training, whereas individuals holding a vocational or univer-
sity degree are assumed to represent high-skilled labour. To obtain net earnings per
month, income taxes and social security contributions are to be deducted from gross
monthly earnings. The share in social security contributions borne by employees is
taken to amount to 20 per cent of gross monthly earnings. At present, gross monthly
earnings of 400 C= are being exempted from social security contributions14. Income
taxes are calculated on the basis of taxable income, which is obtained by subtracting
a standard deduction from gross earnings. To determine income taxes to be paid by
each household type, we apply the present German income tax schedule to taxable
earnings15. For couple households, income tax legislation allows for marital income
splitting: according to this method, the tax schedule is applied to half of the joint
taxable income, while the resulting tax amount is doubled to obtain total income
taxes to be paid by the couple.
14Since April 2003, there is a phase-in range for social security contributions, with the amount
borne by employees successively increasing from about 4 per cent to 20 per cent of gross earnings
within a gross monthly income range between 400 C= and 800 C=. However, the present calculations
abstract from this phase-in range and simply assume a social security contribution rate of 20 per
cent for gross monthly earnings exceeding 400 C=.
15The German income tax schedule is smoothly progressive. At present, taxable earnings below
7235 C= per year are being exempted from income taxes (§ 32a, EStG). For the sake of simplicity,
we apply to all taxable income amounts which exceed this tax allowance the schedule specified for
taxable earnings between 9252 and 55007 C=. For a income range corresponding to taxable earnings
between 7235 and 9252 C= per annum, this involves a slight overestimation of income taxes.
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